Feminist logic may favor bilateralist strong negation

What the study found: The paper argues that inferentialism, as currently framed, is not sufficiently attentive to socio-political power dynamics. It also argues that bilateralist representations of proof systems can better accommodate feminist concerns, and that a bilateralist version of Nelson’s paraconsistent logic of constructible falsity is a promising alternative to classical negation.
Why the authors say this matters: The authors say a feminist-informed inferentialism should move beyond a neutral idea of the “social” and include the ways linguistic and inferential practices are shaped by political structures. They also suggest that, if retaining a primitive negation to express difference is desirable, strong negation may provide a more promising foundation for feminist logic than classical negation.
What the researchers tested: The paper examines inferentialism in light of feminist logic. In its second part, it considers implications for logical systems and focuses on bilateralist representations of proof systems, drawing on Plumwood’s critique of classical negation and Nelson’s paraconsistent logic of constructible falsity.
What worked and what didn't: The paper finds that inferentialism’s current focus is presented as insufficiently attentive to power dynamics. It further argues that classical negation displays hierarchical and oppressive structures, while bilateralist proof systems and strong negation are presented as more suitable for feminist concerns.
What to keep in mind: The abstract does not describe empirical testing or formal proof details. The claims reported here are argumentative and theoretical, and the available summary does not state limitations beyond the scope of the paper’s discussion.

Key points

• The paper argues that inferentialism does not sufficiently address socio-political power dynamics.
• It proposes a feminist-informed inferentialism that includes political structures in accounts of language and inference.
• The paper says bilateralist proof systems can accommodate feminist concerns.
• It draws on Plumwood’s critique of classical negation and Nelson’s paraconsistent logic of constructible falsity.
• The authors suggest strong negation may be a better foundation for feminist logic than classical negation.