Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

External reference: https://openalex.org/T11477

  1. Understanding is proposed as an alternative basis for access internalism
    Philosophical examination proposing objectual understanding as an alternative to knowledge-theoretic formulations of access internalism in epistemology.
  2. Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism is argued to support naturalism
    Philosophical analysis of how Wittgenstein's anti-scientistic approach permits a naturalistic philosophy of religion without supernaturalism.
  3. Ability and epistemic position are treated as the same kind of modality
    Analysis arguing that an agent's position to know reduces to ability to know through compossibility, subsuming epistemic modality under agentive modality.
  4. "Did He Love?"
    Wittgenstein-informed analysis of how the indeterminacy of psychological concepts like love affects certainty in understanding others' minds and ethical attitudes toward shared life.
  5. Commentary argues for deeper reasons to reject temporal neutrality
    Commentary on Scheffler's treatment of Parfit's temporal neutrality argument, proposing that fundamental grounds beyond relationships justify rejecting temporal neutrality.
  6. Instructions can provide reasons by conveying practical information
    Explore how instructions convey information about rational conclusions and establish reasons for action, bridging the philosophical gap between declarative and imperative sentences in decision-making.
  7. Arbitrary reference conflicts with weak discernibility
    Philosophical analysis establishing logical incompatibility between arbitrary reference theory and the metaphysical possibility of weakly discernible entities.
  8. Logic’s neutrality is framed as theory closure
    Interprets logic's neutrality through theory closure within a metalinguistic framework distinguishing validity from truth, connecting theory construction with logical structure.
  9. Wittgenstein is presented as a methodological naturalist
    Explore Wittgensteinian methodological naturalism as a metaphilosophical constraint on philosophy independent of metaphysical commitments, distinguishing it from ontological positions.