Focal Interest
Focal Interest
AI Summary of Peer-Reviewed Research

This page presents an AI-generated summary of a published research paper. The original authors did not write or review this article. [See full disclosure ↓]

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Supplier leadership and network ties drive collusive bargaining

Two business professionals in dark suits sit across from each other at a wooden conference table in a high-rise office with floor-to-ceiling windows overlooking a city skyline; the person on the left holds a pen and notebook, while the person on the right also has a pen and document, suggesting an active negotiation or business discussion.
Research area:Business, Management and AccountingOutsourcing and Supply Chain ManagementNegotiation

What the study found

Exploitative supplier leadership and distributor network embeddedness were identified as key factors associated with distributor collusive bargaining behavior, while asymmetric asset specificity in the distributor’s favor acted as an inhibitor. The study also found a positive link between collusive bargaining behavior and distributor opportunism, and this link was weaker when market uncertainty was higher.

Why the authors say this matters

The authors conclude that the study offers a fresh perspective on bargaining behavior in a supply chain network context. The findings indicate that it helps build a more comprehensive understanding of collusive bargaining behavior.

What the researchers tested

The researchers studied a supply chain with one supplier and multiple distributors, focusing on collusive bargaining behavior, meaning distributors negotiate with the supplier together to pursue common interests or self-interest. They collected survey data from 327 Chinese distributors and analyzed it using hierarchical regression analyses.

What worked and what didn't

Exploitative supplier leadership and distributor network embeddedness were positively associated with distributor collusive bargaining behavior. Asymmetric asset specificity in the distributor’s favor was negatively associated with collusive bargaining behavior. Distributor collusive bargaining behavior was positively linked to distributor opportunism, and market uncertainty weakened that link.

What to keep in mind

The abstract does not describe detailed limitations beyond the study’s survey-based design and its sample of 327 Chinese distributors. The findings are presented for the specific supply-chain setting studied in the paper.

Key points

  • Exploitative supplier leadership was a key factor associated with distributor collusive bargaining behavior.
  • Distributor network embeddedness was also identified as a key factor linked to collusive bargaining behavior.
  • Asymmetric asset specificity in the distributor’s favor inhibited collusive bargaining behavior.
  • Collusive bargaining behavior was positively linked to distributor opportunism.
  • Market uncertainty weakened the link between collusive bargaining behavior and distributor opportunism.

Disclosure

Research title:
Supplier leadership and network ties drive collusive bargaining
Publication date:
2026-03-11
DOI:
10.1108/jbim-07-2024-0469
OpenAlex record:
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AI provenance: AI provenance information is not available for this post.

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